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INTRODUCTION
Rational political action committees (PACs) will give campaign contributions to candidates for
two main reasons.  Either the contributions are intended to influence the actions taken by
winning candidates once they are in office, or they are intended to affect the outcome of the
election.  Grossman and Helpman (1996) refer to the former reason as an influence motive and
the latter as an electoral motive for campaign contributions.  Stated more blandly, a PAC can
manipulate government policies either by buying policies directly from legislators or by buying
elections.  In the latter case, the PAC attempts to sway the election in favor of the candidate
whose views are most in line with that of the PAC.
This paper attempts to answer the question: do political action committees give money to
candidates to influence the positions they adopt or to influence the outcome of the election?
Five major policy issues in the 1996 congressional elections are examined: the North American
Free Trade Agreement, the Family and Medical Leave Act, a ban on partial birth abortions, cuts
in the B-2 bomber program, and gun control.  The results suggest that interested political action
committees give campaign contributions to challengers primarily in order to affect the outcome
of the election.  Campaign contributions to challengers significantly affect the election outcome,
but they do not affect the policy positions adopted by challengers on any of the five issues.  The
results about contributions to incumbents are less clear-cut.  Contributions received by
incumbents do not raise their chances of winning the election, and on only one of the six issues
examined do they significantly raise the probability the incumbent will adopt a policy stance
favorable to the interest group.  Contributions do, however, flow more readily to incumbents
who are able, by virtue of a leadership position in Congress or because they are members of
relevant committees, to provide important services to interest groups.
The paper adds to the existing literature in a number of ways.  First, it is the only
empirical paper to estimate the effect of campaign contributions on both incumbent and
challenger policy positions before they are elected to office.  Many studies examine the impact
of campaign contributions on legislators in office, but there is clearly a sample selection issue
involved in each of these studies since many viable candidates are excluded from the sample by
virtue of having lost the election.  Because it includes both candidates, this study can also
answer related questions of interest.  Do interest groups consider the policy positions adopted by2
both candidates in the election in determining the campaign donations they will give to each
one?  What effect do candidates’ personal characteristics, as opposed to the characteristics of the
congressional district, have on the policy positions they adopt?
The next section provides a brief literature review on the role of campaign contributions
in determining election outcomes and in affecting legislators’ policy choices.  Section 3
develops a simple theoretical model of PAC contribution behavior, and section 4 adapts the
model for use in the empirical estimation.  Sections 5 and 6 present the empirical results and
concluding remarks.
LITERATURE REVIEW
There have been many papers in the economics and political science literatures that have
examined whether campaign contributions affect election outcomes and other papers have
examined the effect of campaign contributions on legislator policy positions.  Very few have
looked at both reasons for PACs to give money, however, and have tried to parse out
empirically the campaign contributions that are given to affect policy choices from those that
affect election outcomes, as this papers attempts to do.
Two studies that do attempt to judge whether campaign contributions are given because
of an electoral motive or an influence motive are by Stephen Bronars and John Lott (1997) and
by Thomas Stratmann (1998).  Bronars and Lott (1997) test whether campaign contributions
affect how congress members vote by examining their voting patterns in their last congressional
cycle before retirement.  If PAC contributions are pulling politicians away from voting in their
preferred manner, they should move back to their preferred policy position after announcing
their upcoming retirement because reelection is no longer a goal.  Despite a large decline in
campaign contributions received during their last election cycle, retiring legislators do not
change their voting patterns in any significant manner.  Bronars and Lott interpret this evidence
to mean that PAC money does not influence how legislators vote, but rather that PACs are
successful at sorting into office candidates who support their positions.  Further evidence that
campaign contributions are given with an electoral motive comes from interviews of 20 major
political action committees.  These groups stated that they never gave to both candidates in an
election simultaneously except in exceptional circumstances.  Poole and Romer (1985) also3
noted that few interest groups give to both candidates in an election, as they might if the
contributors were trying to affect candidates’ policy choices.
Stratmann (1998) investigates whether campaign donations are intended for electoral or
for influence purposes by looking at the timing of campaign contributions.  He finds that farm
PACs increased the number and amount of weekly contributions around the time of farm
subsidy votes in Congress.  The amount of the increase due to the farm subsidy vote was greater
than the increase in contributions at the time of primary elections but smaller than the increase
at the time of the general election.  Thus, he concludes that PACs give campaign money to
affect both elections and legislator behavior.
Empirical evidence from other studies is also mixed on whether campaign contributions
affect legislative voting behavior.  Answering the question is complicated by the fact that
campaign contributions are endogenous – interest groups with an electoral motive give
donations to candidates who would likely support the group’s position even in the absence of
the contribution.  Chappell (1982) finds that when he controls for their endogeneity, campaign
contributions do not significantly affect legislative voting in any of the seven issues he
examines.  Stratmann (1991), however, uses the same empirical method to show that
contributions significantly affect legislators’ votes on eight out of ten agricultural policy bills
analyzed. Baldwin and Magee (1999) find that contributions from business and labor groups
play an important role in determining representatives’ voting on the North American Free Trade
Agreement, on the GATT Uruguay Round Agreement, and on granting fast-track negotiating
authority to President Clinton in 1998.  In a review of the literature, Bender and Lott (1996)
conclude that politicians vote in their constituent interests in “the vast majority of cases.”  They
argue that when campaign contributions do affect legislators’ voting behavior, the deviation
between the representatives’ actions and constituency interests is not large.  Morton and
Cameron (1992) suggest that campaign money is more likely to affect legislators’ behavior
when the economic effects of the bills under consideration are concentrated on particular
interest groups and when the issues are less publicly visible.
The effect of campaign contributions on election outcomes is also somewhat in dispute.
The “early empirical evidence” according to Morton and Cameron (1992) and the “conventional
wisdom” according to Levitt (1995) is that election spending by candidates has a very large
impact on election outcomes, but that spending by incumbents is relatively unproductive.  This
view is argued strongly by Jacobson (1978, 1985), who finds little or no effect of incumbent4
spending on election results but very large effects of challenger expenditures.  Abramowitz
(1988) supports this result as well.  He finds that campaign spending by challengers has a much
larger effect on senate election outcomes than incumbent expenditures.  Challenger spending, in
fact, is “the single most important variable affecting an incumbent senator’s chance of being
reelected.” (p. 397)
Green and Krasno (1988) and Levitt (1994) disagree with the view that challenger
spending has a much bigger effect on election outcomes than incumbent spending, but for
different reasons.  Green and Krasno find that when a new measure of challenger political
quality is included in the regressions, the incumbent’s spending has a much bigger effect on the
election outcome than previous estimates had suggested.  Levitt (1994) uses repeated elections
between the same two candidates to control for the political quality of each.  He finds that
spending by challengers and spending by incumbents have a similar, very small impact on the
election results.  Thus, the empirical literature is divided about the effects of campaign money
on both legislator voting behavior and election outcomes.
A MODEL OF PAC BEHAVIOR
Committees are assumed to behave rationally, an assumption that Stratmann (1992) supports
with empirical evidence.  Suppose that a lobby cares about the outcome of bill j that will be
brought up in the next Congress.  Let P be the utility or the profits of the lobby members, and Pj
be the policy outcome of the bill.  For simplicity, assume that there are only two outcomes:
either the bill passes Congress (Pj=1), or it fails to pass (Pj=0).  The lobby’s expected profits are
(1)  C S P P E j j - + P = - + P = = P 0 1 )) 1 Pr( 1 ( ) 1 Pr( ) ( ,
where P1 represents the lobby’s utility when the bill passes, P0 is the utility when the bill fails,
C is the lobby’s campaign contribution, and S represents the dollar value of unobserved services
provided to the lobby by legislators.  These unobserved agenda development services include
representatives writing or amending bills and using their influence in committees to promote or
hinder legislation.
Suppose that there are two candidates for office in each election to the legislature, which
has N total seats.  The probability that the bill passes the legislature is5
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where gkm is the probability that candidate m in congressional district k is elected, pjkm is the
probability that candidate m in congressional district k votes for policy j, and pjk(-m) is defined
similarly for candidate m’s opponent.  There are two ways that a lobby can affect the policy
outcome in this setting.  First, the lobby can give campaign funds to influence the outcome of
the elections, thus raising the probability that a candidate who supports the lobby’s preferred
position is elected.  Second, the lobby can try to affect the policy stances of the candidates for
office.
A rational political action committee wishing to maximize its expected profits will give
campaign contributions to candidate m in congressional district k until:
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The first term in equation (4) represents the electoral motive for a political action
committee to give campaign contributions.  If the two candidates in a congressional district have
different stances on policy j, a lobby can affect the probability that a policy is adopted by
contributing money to affect the election outcome.  The effect of the lobby’s campaign6
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.  If the electoral motive is important in determining a PAC’s
campaign contributions, then their donations will increase if the candidate supports their
position and decrease if the candidate’s opponent supports their preferred policy choice.
The second term represents the policy motive for contributions.  By influencing the
policy positions adopted by candidates, a lobby’s campaign funds can affect the expected
number of votes in favor of a policy j in the next congress.  The direct policy effect of
contributions on the expected number of votes policy j is the probability that the candidate is








.  An increase in the probability that a candidate will win the election should
elicit greater campaign contributions from an interest group that wants to influence the
candidates’ policy choice.
The last term on the LHS of equation (4) represents services that elected officials
provide for lobby groups that contribute to the candidates’ campaigns if they win the election.
While these agenda development services are not observable, the ability of a politician to
provide interest groups with valuable services is likely to rise with the legislator’s position as a
leader within Congress and with membership on important committees.
EMPIRICAL MODEL
This paper develops a multiple equation empirical model based on the theoretical model in the
previous section to estimate the probability that a candidate wins the election, the contributions
candidates receive, and the policy choices they make.
The election outcome is assumed to be a function of the personal characteristics of the
two candidates and the total campaign contributions that each candidate has available to use in
support of his or her campaign.  Since donors give campaign funds to candidates who are more
likely to win and candidates will seek more money if they are involved in a close race, the
contribution variables must be treated as endogenous.  The endogenous nature of contributions7
is consistent with the observed relationship between a candidate’s margin of victory and
campaign receipts.
Figures 1, 2, and 3 plot contributions received against the margin of victory for
challengers facing other challengers, for challengers facing incumbents, and for incumbents.
The pattern in all three figures is that candidates in close races receive greater contributions on
average than candidates who win or lose in a landslide.  For open seat elections, challengers in
races in which the margin of victory is less than 20 percentage points receive $757,000 on
average in campaign contributions.  Average receipts in open seat races with a margin of victory
between 20 and 40 percentage are $547,000, and average receipts in races with a greater than 40
percentage point margin of victory are $213,000.  A similar pattern emerges for incumbents, as
Figure 3 shows.  Those who won close races (margin<20) received $1,021,000 on average in
campaign contributions while defeated incumbents received slightly less ($812,000).  Winners
by 20-40 percentage points amassed only $636,000 in contributions and landslide victors
garnered $503,000 on average.
Figure 2 reveals the strong positive correlation between campaign receipts and the
electoral success of challengers facing incumbents.  While the average receipts by challengers
facing incumbents was $253,000, no challenger who won the election received less than
$621,000.  Only three challengers who amassed $500,000 in campaign receipts lost the election
by more than 20 percentage points.  This correlation can not, of course, reveal whether the
contributions enable the candidates to mount a stronger challenge or whether the money flows
to candidates who are expected to do well.
In order to separate out the effect of contributions on election outcomes from the effect
of expected outcomes on campaign receipts, this paper estimates the following a system of
equations:
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where CI and CC are the campaign contributions received by incumbents and challengers, votesI
is the percentage of the popular vote received by the incumbent, E(votesI) is the expected8
percentage of votes received by the incumbent, F is the cumulative standard normal distribution,
and X, Y, and Z are vectors of exogenous explanatory variables.  In the estimation, the expected
outcome is equal to the predicted outcome in equation (5): E(votesI)
) ( 3 2 1 0 C I C a C a X a a F + + + .  The estimate of a2 reveals the effect that campaign spending by
incumbents has on the election outcome and a3 reveals the effect of spending by challengers.
The model allows each candidate to respond to a strong challenge from the opponent by raising
greater contributions.  The coefficients b2 and d2 reveal the extent to which incumbents and
challengers alter their fund-raising in response to the contributions raised by their opponent.
The estimates in equation (5) yield a predicted vote share for the incumbent while
equations (6) and (7) determine the predicted contributions received by each candidate.  In a
simultaneous equation model, certain exclusion restrictions are required to identify the model.
The variable excluded from the contributions equations but included in equation (5) is the
margin of victory in the congressional district of the presidential candidate from the incumbent’s
party.  This variable reflects the party strength of the incumbent representative in the district, but
it should not directly affect the contributions he or she receives.  The variables excluded from
equation (5) are: terms in office, a dummy variable indicating if the candidate was the chair or
ranking member of a committee in 1994-95, age, regional dummy variables, the incumbent’s
campaign receipts in the 1994 election cycle, and whether or not the candidate was involved in a
primary.  Each of these variables affects the candidate’s ability or inclination to amass
contributions without directly affecting his or her chances of success in the election.  The
system of equations is estimated by full-information maximum likelihood.
The second stage of the model in this paper examines the effect that campaign
contributions have on the policy decisions candidates make.  Candidates are assumed to make
policy decisions based on personal traits, characteristics of their congressional district, and
campaign contributions given by groups who support or oppose each bill.  Again, the campaign
contributions given by these groups are endogenous because committees will give more money
to candidates who are predisposed to support the committee’s preferred position.   The system
of equations estimated is:
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where Pjm is candidate m’s decision on policy j, F is the cumulative standard normal
distribution, Xd is a vector of district characteristics, Xpm and Ypm are personal characteristics of
candidate m, Im is a dummy variable indicating that candidate m is an incumbent, Cjm (C(-j)m) is
the contributions that candidate m receives from groups who support (oppose) policy j, and Pj(-m)
is the policy decision of the opposing candidate.
Equation (8) estimates the determinants of candidates’ policy choices.  The statistical
significance of the coefficients in the vector f2 provide a test of whether or not personal ideology
enters into candidates’ decisions on policy issues.  The coefficients f3 and f4 reveal the effects of
campaign contributions on the policy stances adopted by incumbents and challengers
respectively.
Equation (9) estimates the campaign contributions a candidate receives from political
action committees for and against each policy stance.  These contributions are determined by the
personal characteristics of the candidate as well as by the policy stance adopted.  The theoretical
model deriving equation (4) predicts that if PACs have an electoral motive to give campaign
donations, there will be a positive coefficient estimate g2 and a negative estimate of g3.  Support
for a PAC’s preferred policy stance (and opposition to that stance by the candidate’s electoral
opponent) should lead to greater campaign contributions from the PAC.  Because of difficulty
attaining convergence of the parameters using full information maximum likelihood, the
simultaneous equation system is estimated by general method of moments.
Five policy choices are examined in this paper.  The first policy issue is support for the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) which eliminated trade barriers between the
United States, Canada, and Mexico.  The Heckscher-Ohlin model predicts that in the United
States, which is capital-abundant relative to Mexico, capital owners will benefit from trade
liberalization while the scarce factor, labor, will be hurt. Consistent with this prediction, labor
groups strongly opposed NAFTA while business groups generally supported it.  This paper
treats contributions from business groups as being in support of NAFTA and those from labor
groups as opposing NAFTA.  Baldwin and Magee (1999) present evidence that campaign
contributions from labor groups were associated with votes against the 1993 NAFTA bill while
business group contributions were correlated with votes in favor of the bill.  The Family and
Medical Leave Act (FMLA), which would require businesses to provide leave for workers who10
give birth, adopt a child, or have a medical emergency, is the second policy issue examined in
this paper.  Political action committees representing labor groups are assumed to support this act
while those representing business groups are assumed to oppose it.
A third policy issue examined in this paper is a bill proposing a ban on partial-birth
abortions.  Interest groups identified as pro-life are assumed to support the bill while pro-choice
groups are assumed to oppose it.  Candidates’ positions on a proposal to cut spending for B-2
bombers are also examined.  Defense Aerodynamics political action committees (identified by
the Center for Responsive Politics, www.crp.org) are assumed to oppose the proposal while
interest groups advocating a reduction in military spending support it.  The final policy issue
analyzed is the Brady bill restricting sales of handguns.  Handgun control groups are assumed to
support this bill while the NRA and other gun rights groups oppose it.
RESULTS
Table 1 presents the variables, the data source from which they were taken, and the means in the
data set. The data are described more fully in the appendix.  The average candidate was 48.5
years old, received $520,000 in campaign contributions (about 39% of it from PACs), made
$494,000 in campaign expenditures, and received 102,000 votes.
Table 2 presents the results of estimating equations (5) – (7).  These equations are
estimated using campaign contributions received by candidates rather than their expenditures.
Campaign receipts and expenditures are highly correlated (correlation = 0.96), however, and
using expenditures rather than receipts does not change the results.  Because equation (5) is
nonlinear, interpreting the coefficients is difficult.  Thus, the second column of numbers in
Table 2 reveals the marginal effects of a unit change in the right-hand-side variables on the
dependent variable, calculated from the average values of the continuous right-hand side
variables and from zero for the dummy variables.
Table 2 reveals that campaign receipts by challengers in the 1996 House elections have a
statistically significant negative effect on the fraction of the popular vote received by the
incumbent.  An increase of $100,000 in a challenger’s campaign receipts lowers the
incumbent’s share of the vote by 2.3 percentage points.  For incumbents, however, contributions
have a negligible impact on their expected vote share.  An increase of $100,000 in contributions
received by the incumbent raises his or her expected fraction of the popular vote by only 0.1611
percentage points.  Thus, the results in this paper support the conventional wisdom that
contributions received by challengers are very important in securing victory but that receipts by
incumbents do not help the reelection effort and may merely reflect a higher quality challenger.
The results also support the view that restrictions on campaign spending will harm challengers
more than incumbents.  Based on the estimates in Table 2, the average incumbent would lose an
expected 1.1 percentage points in the share of the popular vote if her contributions were reduced
to zero while gaining 6.1 percentage points if the average challenger’s campaign receipts were
restricted to zero.
Because simultaneous equation models are very sensitive to exclusion restrictions and
other assumptions of the model, this paper performs a number of robustness tests that are
included in Table 2.  The estimation was performed excluding outliers, defined as candidates
with above 80% of the popular vote or above $3,000,000 in campaign receipts and using an
alternative estimation procedure (generalized method of moments).  Coefficients whose signs
reverse when outliers are excluded are marked with O and those that are sensitive to the
estimation technique are marked E.
A final sensitivity analysis examines how robust the estimates of a2 and a3 (the effect of
incumbent and challenger campaign receipts on election results) are to changes in the
instrumental variables.  The model was re-estimated excluding each variable in the contribution
equations (individually) and the resulting estimates of a2 and a3 are presented in the last two
columns of the second half of Table 2.  The effect of challenger receipts on election outcomes
(a3) remains large and highly significant throughout the sensitivity analysis.  The impact of
incumbent receipts on election outcomes does vary across the model specifications (and
switches signs once), although in every case the coefficient estimate is small.
The other coefficients in the election outcome equation have the expected signs.
Incumbents facing challengers who have held previous office or who were the previous party
nominee for the House of Representatives have 1.5 and 2.8 percentage point lower vote shares
on average.  A rise of 1 percentage point in the margin of victory by presidential candidate in
1996 in the incumbent’s party means a 0.2 percentage point increase in the incumbent’s12
expected vote share.  Each term in office is also associated with a 0.2 percentage point increase
in the incumbent’s fraction of the popular vote.
Table 3 presents the results of estimating the NAFTA and Family and Medical Leave
Act policy decisions and the contributions received from labor and business groups.  The two
issues are estimated simultaneously since labor and business groups may have both policy issues
in mind when they make campaign contributions.  The table presents the coefficient estimate as
well as the marginal effect of a unit change in the right-hand side variable on the dependent
variable.  The contribution variable in this table is the difference between business (pro-
NAFTA, anti-FMLA) contributions and labor (anti-NAFTA, pro-FMLA) contributions.  The
baseline probability reveals the model’s predicted probability of support for the bill from an
otherwise average candidate with even contributions from business and labor groups and with
dummy variables set to zero.
Campaign contributions from business groups and labor groups have no statistically
significant effect on either challenger or incumbent positions on NAFTA.  For challengers, the
insignificance of the coefficient reflects a large standard error rather than a small coefficient.  A
$1000 increase in business contributions raises a challenger’s likelihood of voting for NAFTA
by 0.76 percentage points but lowers the probability an incumbent will vote for NAFTA by 0.04
percentage points.  The other right-hand side variables affect representatives’ policy choices in
an expected manner.  Congressmen from districts with export-oriented employment, that were
largely Hispanic, and where the union presence was weak were more likely to support NAFTA.
Consistent with the view that NAFTA would harm low-skill workers, representatives from
districts with a high proportion of residents without a high school degree tended to oppose
NAFTA.
Contributions do have a statistically significant effect on incumbents’ policy stances on
the Family and Medical Leave Act, but the sign of the coefficient is contrary to expectations and
the estimated impact on support for the act is small.  The greater the campaign contributions an
incumbent receives from labor groups relative to business groups, the more likely it is he or she
will oppose the FMLA.  Contributions do not significantly affect the policy stances adopted by
challengers, although the point estimates of the coefficients are very similar.  A $1000 increase
in labor contributions lowers the probability of supporting the FMLA by 0.08 and 0.1
percentage points for challengers and incumbents respectively.  Democrats from strongly13
unionized districts, particularly those districts that voted Democratic in the 1996 presidential
election, were more likely to support the FMLA.
The last part of Table 3 shows the factors affecting how much financial support a
candidate receives from business groups relative to labor groups.  An electoral motive for
campaign contributions suggests that PACs will give more money to candidates who adopt their
favored position and less money to a candidate whose opponent also adopts the interest group’s
favored policy stance.  The coefficients on the NAFTA and the FMLA policy choice variables
show that business PACs gave more and labor PACs gave less money to candidates who
supported NAFTA and to those who opposed the FMLA.  A NAFTA supporter received about
$73,000 more from business groups (net of labor contributions) than a NAFTA opponent.  An
FMLA opponent received about $122,000 more from business groups (net of labor
contributions) than an FMLA supporter.  On both bills, the policy stance adopted by the
opponent of a candidate had only a small and statistically insignificant effect on his or her
receipts from business and labor groups.
The results in Table 3 also suggest that PACs gave campaign donations with an eye
toward the agenda development services that incumbent legislators could provide.  Incumbents
who were members of the House Ways and Means Committee received about $98,000 more
from business groups while membership on the Commerce Committee raised contributions from
business groups by $99,000 relative to the donations of labor groups.  Members of the
Education and Labor committee and members of the labor subcommittee of Appropriations, on
the other hand, received $55,000 and $48,000 more from labor groups, respectively.
Incumbents who were the chair or ranking member of committees or who had a leadership
position in Congress received $38,000 more contributions from business groups (relative to their
labor receipts) than did otherwise identical incumbents without a leadership position.
Table 4 presents the results of estimating the abortion policy decisions and the
contributions from groups interested in this issue.  As with NAFTA and FMLA, campaign
contributions do not significantly affect the policy stance adopted by candidates, but campaign
donations do flow to candidates who support the interest groups’ preferred position.  Candidates
who supported the ban on partial-birth abortions received over $4000 more from pro-life groups
net of pro-choice contributions.  This difference in donations represents an enormous increase,
considering that the average candidate received only $1,260 from pro-life groups and $710 from
pro-choice groups.  Also consistent with an electoral motive for PAC giving is the estimate14
showing that pro-life groups reduced their donations by over $800 if the candidate’s opponent
was also in favor of the ban on partial-birth abortions.  The abortion policy stance was split
largely along party lines, as evidenced by the very large coefficient estimate on the Democrat
variable.
The determinants of national defense policy positions and the contributions from
interested PACs are presented in Table 5.  Defense spending is the only policy choice in which
campaign contributions significantly sway incumbents to vote in the interest group’s preferred
manner.  A reduction in contributions received by the defense lobby of $1000 raises the
incumbent’s probability of voting for the reduction in defense spending by about 2.5 percentage
points.  Challengers’ policy positions on this issue were not statistically significantly affected by
campaign contributions, although the estimated coefficient is quite large.  Some evidence that
“hawk” PACs have an influence motive is given by the estimate that members of the national
security committee receive $11,558 more in campaign contributions from defense PACs relative
to “dove” groups.  These targeted donations represent an increase of over four times the average
defense lobby contributions to candidates ($2650).
Unlike the other policy issues examined, contributions from the defense lobby and from
“dove” groups do not significantly respond to the defense spending policy choice adopted by the
candidates.  The coefficient estimate on the B-2 bomber bill variable in the contribution
equation, while not statistically significant, is positive and economically nontrivial.  A candidate
who supports a reduction in defense spending received, on average, about $1641 less from
defense groups than an otherwise identical “defense hawk.”  The positive coefficient on the
opponent’s policy stance, however, is inconsistent with an electoral motive for contributing.
Both district and personal characteristics affected a candidate’s stance on reducing
military spending.  Candidates were less likely to vote for reductions in spending if there was
considerable military employment in the congressional district.  Every 1,000 workers employed
by the military in the district reduced by 1.8 percentage points the likelihood that a candidate
would support reductions in defense spending.  Candidates who had served in the military
themselves were also 16.5 percentage points less likely to vote for cutting defense spending.
The factors affecting candidates’ decisions about gun control and the contributions from
interested political action committees are presented in Table 6.  The coefficients on
contributions received by challengers and incumbents from gun control groups are both positive
(and the challenger point estimate is quite large), but neither is statistically significant.  Both15
district and personal characteristics of candidates affect their gun control policy decision.
Candidates are more likely to support gun control if they represent wealthy districts in states
with a large police force relative to the population.  Women and democrats are also more likely
to support gun control.
The coefficient estimates in the second half of Table 6 provide strong evidence that
political action committees interested in gun control issues are giving money primarily from an
electoral motive.  Contributions from gun control groups (net of contributions from gun right
groups) rise by about $6600 when a candidate supports the Brady bill.  Furthermore, these
contributions fall by about $1300 when a candidate’s opponent also supports the Brady bill.
Both coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level.
The results in Tables 3 – 7 suggest that campaign contributions respond to candidates’
policy stances rather than influencing them.  In only one case out of five examined did the
contributions significantly affect the policy position adopted by incumbents in the expected
manner, and contributions never significantly influenced challengers’ policy stances.  For four
of the five issues examined, however, the candidates’ policy positions significantly affected the
pattern of campaign contributions that they received (at the 1% level).  Further evidence in favor
of the electoral motive is shown by the statistically significant negative coefficients on the
opponent’s policy decision in two of the five policy stances examined.  In these cases, interest
groups supporting a particular act gave less money to a candidate if his or her opponent
supported the act.
The one policy decision that breaks the pattern described above is national defense
spending.  For that issue, campaign contributions did not significantly respond to candidates’
policy stances (and the coefficient on the opponent’s policy stance variable was positive).
Campaign contributions did significantly affect the national defense policy positions adopted by
incumbents.
CONCLUSION
The results in this paper suggest that political action committees give money to challengers
primarily to affect the probability that the candidate is elected.  Campaign contributions
received by challengers have a large effect on the outcome of the election, but in none of the
five policy issues examined in this paper do they affect the candidate’s policy stance.16
Consistent with an electoral motive for donations, however, the pattern of campaign
contributions received by candidates was significantly affected by their policy stances on four of
the five issues.  In two of the five policy choices, the opponent’s policy decision also
significantly affected the contributions a candidate received.
Some evidence is presented here that political action committee donations to
incumbent campaigns are given for an influence motive.  Consistent with the conventional
wisdom, contributions received by incumbents did not raise their likelihood of winning the
election.  Most campaign contributions to incumbents appear to be given to gain services
that elected officials can provide influencing the legislative agenda rather than to affect the
candidate’s policy stance.  In only one of the five issues examined, national defense
spending, did campaign contributions raise the probability that incumbents running for
re-election would support the interest groups’ preferred policy positions. Contributions
flowed more readily, however, to members of committees with control over legislation
important to the interest groups.17
APPENDIX
The policy positions taken by candidates for the House of Representatives come from a survey
by Congressional Quarterly.  Each candidate was asked his or her policy stances on a number of
issues, including defense spending, abortion, medical leave from work, gun control, and
international trade.  The questions asked of each candidate are listed below.
This paper examines only elections in which there was both a democrat and republican
vying for the general election.  Of the 435 congressional districts, eighteen were uncontested
races while two elections were won by independent candidates.  The data set in this paper
includes the 830 candidates in the other 415 elections.  Of these, 667 responded to the
Congressional Quarterly survey and gave their policy positions.  The data were supplemented
with responses to Project Vote Smart’s National Political Awareness Test (NPAT), which also
surveyed candidates on their policy positions.  The NPAT identified an additional 52
candidates’ positions on NAFTA, 24 positions on the Brady bill, and 28 candidates’ positions
on partial-birth abortion.
The proportion of private sector workers in each congressional district who were
members of unions in 1991-92 is from Box-Steffenmeier, Arnold, and Zorn (1997).  Presidential
voting by district is available in the Almanac of American Politics.  Other information such as
military employment and per-capita income is from county level data at the Bureau of
Economic Analysis’ Regional Economic Information System at
http://fisher.lib.virginia.edu/reis/county.html.  These county level data were mapped into
congressional districts using data on the fraction of each county’s population that lived in a
particular congressional district in 1990 (available in Congressional Districts in the 1990’s).
Congressional districts’ ratios of export employment to import employment were obtained
similarly using county level employment data from County Business Patterns.
Congressional Quarterly’s survey questions
1.  Would you have voted for legislation to implement the “NAFTA” trade agreement, which
linked the United States, Canada, and Mexico in a free-trade zone and required each country
to eliminate numerous tariffs and trade barriers?18
2.  Would you have voted for the Family and Medical Leave Act which requires many
businesses to provide workers with up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave for the birth or adoption
of a child or a medical emergency?
3.  Would you have voted for the bill to ban so-called “partial-birth” abortions, in which the
doctor removes the fetus’ brain tissue after bringing the fetus into the birth canal?  Under the
bill, doctors who perform the procedure could be subject to criminal and civil penalties.
4.  Would you have voted for the amendment to cut $493 million provided for continued
production of B-2 stealth bombers?
5.  Would you have voted for the “Brady bill” which requires each would-be purchaser of a
handgun to wait five days, during which local law enforcement officials conduct a personal




























































































NAFTA 1=vote for NAFTA CQ survey 0.51
Family Leave Act 1=vote for Family and Medical Leave Act CQ survey 0.66
Abortion Bill 1=vote to ban partial-birth abortions CQ survey 0.61
Defense Spending 1=vote to cut B2 bomber spending CQ survey 0.54
Gun Control 1=vote for Brady Bill CQ survey 0.54
Personal Candidate Characteristics
Votes Votes for candidate www.fec.gov 102391.4
Married 1= candidate is married CQ survey 0.80
Children 1=candidate has children CQ survey 0.81
Male 1=candidate is male CQ survey 0.86
Military Service 1=candidate did military service CQ survey 0.31
Incumbent 1=incumbent Politics in America 0.44
Age Age of candidate CQ survey 48.50
Catholic 1=candidate is catholic CQ survey 0.29
Terms Terms in office Politics in America 1.89
Nominee 1=previous nominee for House CQ survey 0.58
Office 1=held elected office CQ survey 0.69
Campaign Contribution Data
Contributions Total campaign contributions ($000) FEC data 520.31
Disbursements Total campaign expenditures ($000) FEC data 493.70
Contributions (Incum) Incumbent campaign contributions ($000) FEC data 725.53
Contributions (Chall.) Challenger campaign contributions ($000) FEC data 339.57
Disbursements (Incum) Incumbent campaign expenditures ($000) FEC data 667.84
Disbursements (Chall) Challenger campaign expenditures ($000) FEC data 333.62
Prochoice Pro-Choice Contributions ($000) FEC data 0.71
Prolife Pro-Life Contributions ($000) FEC data 1.26
Pronafta Pro-NAFTA, anti-Fam Lv Cont. ($000) FEC data 57.88
Anti-NAFTA Anti-NAFTA, pro-Fam Lv Cont. ($000) FEC data 45.96
Probrady Contributions supporting Brady Bill ($000) FEC data 0.06
Anti-Brady Contributions opposing Brady Bill ($000) FEC data 3.04
Pro-B2 Bomber Pro-B2 Bomber cut contributions ($000) FEC data 0.07




Committee Chair 1=Chair/Ranking Committee Member Politics in America 0.07
Education and Labor 1=Education and Labor Committee Politics in America 0.04
Ways and Means 1=on Ways & Means Committee Politics in America 0.04
Trade 1=on Trade Subcommittee Politics in America 0.01
Commerce 1=on Commerce Committee Politics in America 0.05
Small Business 1=on Small Business Committee Politics in America 0.04
Budget 1=on Budget Committee Politics in America 0.04
Military Construction 1=on Military Construction Subcommittee Politics in America 0.01
National Security 1=on National Security Committee Politics in America 0.05
Veterans Committee 1=on Veterans Committee Politics in America 0.03
Judiciary 1=on Judiciary Committee Politics in America 0.04
Labor (Sub) 1=Labor Subcommittee of Appropriations Politics in America 0.02
District Characteristics
No High School Degree % in district without a high school degree US Census 0.25
Percentage Hispanic % Hispanic in district US Census 8.66
Export Ratio Export employment/Import employment County Business Patterns 1.39
Over 65 % over 65 in district US Census 0.12
Military District military employment (000) Regional Economic
Information System (BEA)
5.03
Per-Capita Income 1996 District per-capita income ($000) Regional Economic
Information System (BEA)
24.25
Clinton 1996 District % vote for Clinton Almanac of American
Politics
50.13
Dole 1996 District % vote for Dole Almanac of American
Politics
40.03
Union District union membership % (1992) Box-Steffensmeier,
Arnold, and Zorn (1997)
12.11
State Characteristics
Veterans State % veterans Statistical Abstract of US 0.10
Airforce AF personnel per 1,000 Statistical Abstract of US 1.22
Police Police per 10,000 pop. Statistical Abstract of US 24.89
Violent crime Violent crimes per 100,000 Statistical Abstract of US 625.00
Metropolitan % of state in MSA Statistical Abstract of US 80.10
Abortions Abortions per 1000 women (15-44) Statistical Abstract of US 22.77
Teen Births Births to teens, % of total Statistical Abstract of US 12.7023
Table 2
ELECTION OUTCOME EQUATION
Incumbent Vote Fraction Sensitivity Analysis
Variables Coefficients Marginal Effects
Contributions
Incumbent Contributions 0.00004 0.0016
Challenger Contributions -0.00061 *** -0.0233
Instrumental Variables
Presidential Vote 0.00458 *** 0.1766
Other Variables
Office 0.03968 1.5202
Nominee 0.07173 * 2.7346
Democrat -0.00193 -0.0744 O E




Challenger Receipts Incumbent Receipts Sensitivity Analysis
Variables Coefficients Coefficients a2 a3
Incumbent Fraction of Vote -2059.9800 *** -997.3556 E 0.00014 ** -0.0010 ***
Opponent Contributions 0.1474 *** -0.0975 E -0.00005 * -0.0005 ***
Instrumental Variables
Northeast -8.4499 E O 0.7636 E 0.00002 -0.0006 ***
South 8.6176 35.9325 0.00002 -0.0006 ***
West 57.5124 *** -9.5290 0.00002 -0.0006 ***
Age -0.1632 -11.7625 *** 0.00004 -0.0006 ***
Primary 48.5719 ** 40.8117 0.00005 -0.0006 ***
Committee Chair 113.0473 0.00004 -0.0006 ***
1994 Receipts 0.9164 *** 0.00006 -0.0006 ***
Ways and Means Committee 55.3380 0.00004 -0.0006 ***
Other Variables
Office -2.0325 E 0.00004 -0.0006 ***
Nominee -74.0952 0.00004 -0.0006 ***
Democrat -46.9722 -160.4586 ** 0.00005 -0.0006 ***
Terms in Office 19.7078 ** 0.00005 -0.0006 ***
Constant 1482.8800 *** 1465.5700
R-squared 0.5143 0.4842
Observations 350 350
Log Likelihood -4479 -4479
O, E indicate that the coefficient sign is sensitive to outliers or to the estimation procedure (GMM/FIML)
*, **, *** Indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels24
Table 3
NAFTA Policy Decision
Dependent Variable: 1 = Candidate Supports the North American Free Trade Agreement
Variables Coefficients Marginal Effect
Contributions (Challenger) 0.0197 0.7600
Contributions (Incumbent) -0.0009 -0.0350
District Characteristics
Export Ratio 0.3520 ** 12.7491
Percentage Hispanic 0.0211 *** 0.8137
Union -0.0241 * -0.9325
Per-capita Income 0.0218 0.8404
No High School Degree -2.9251 ** -59.6507







Family and Medical Leave Act Policy Decision
Dependent Variable: 1 = Candidate Supports the Family and Medical Leave Act
Variables Coefficients Marginal Effect
Contributions (Challenger) -0.0025 -0.0753
Contributions (Incumbent) -0.0032 ** -0.0996
District Characteristics
Union 0.0631 *** 1.9824

















Family Lv Act 122.0212 ***
Family Lv Act (opp) 13.6068
Personal Characteristics
Committee Chair 38.2940 **
Ways and Means 98.2029 ***
Commerce 98.7934 ***
Small Business 38.9971
Education and Labor -54.7758 ***











*, **, *** Indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels26
Table 4
Abortion Policy Decision
Dependent Variable: 1 = Candidate Supports a Ban on Partial-Birth Abortions
Variables Coefficients Marginal Effect
Contributions (Challenger) 13.3527 12.5020
Contributions (Incumbent) -0.2702 -6.4389
District Characteristics
Over 65 4.9974 12.5020
Per-capita Income -0.0553 -1.1746
Abortions -0.0348 -0.7318
Teen Births 0.0222 0.4521












Dependent Variable = Pro-life Contributions – Pro-choice Contributions
Variables Coefficients
Policy Decisions
Abortion Bill 4.0084 ***














*, **, *** Indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels27
Table 5
National Defense Policy Decision
Dependent Variable: 1 = Candidate Supports a Reduction in Spending for B-2 Bombers
Variables Coefficients Marginal Effect
Contributions (Challenger) 3.6219 51.0041
Contributions (Incumbent) 0.0632 *** 2.5222
District Characteristics
Veterans 13.9059 ** 51.0202
Air Force -0.0488 -1.9454
Military Employment -0.0442 *** -1.7590
Votes for Clinton -0.0011 -0.0456
Personal Characteristics
Military Service -0.4282 *** -16.4816
Male -0.0904 -3.5967






Dependent Variable = Defense Industry Contributions – “Dove” Group Contributions
Variables Coefficients
Policy Decisions
B-2 Bomber Bill 1.6414

















*, **, *** Indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels28
Table 6
Gun Control Policy Decision
Dependent Variable: 1 = Candidate Supports the Brady Bill Restricting Handgun Sales
Variables Coefficients Marginal Effect
Contributions (Challenger) 146.2041 53.9353
Contributions (Incumbent) 0.0843 3.3559
District Characteristics
Per-capita Income 0.0837 *** 3.3314
Police 0.0414 * 1.6460
Violent Crimes -0.0003 -0.0108
Metropolitan 0.0093 0.3700
Votes for Clinton 0.0089 0.3556
Personal Characteristics
Male -0.4711 ** -17.6261
Military Service 0.0726 2.8893






Dependent Variable = Gun Control Group Contributions – Gun Rights Group Contributions
Variables Coefficients
Policy Decisions
Brady Bill 6.5779 ***













*, **, *** Indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels29
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